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In the process of thinking about the law and its purposes, some
of us are, I fear, even now drafting the game plan for Armageddon.
As Chicken Little craws the crack of doom, we huddle here in the
middle of a law review fingering shiny trinkets of rational thought,
thought insanely disassociated from the darkening world. For we
have been summoned to do battle against the penguins. Summoned,
not by Tom O'Bedlam's knight of air and fancies, but by an emi-
nently respectable professor of law.
How did we get into such a fix?
They tell a story, and will tell it still as the last penguin walks
about the last rock and man is only an unpleasant memory. One day,
it seems, an ant came upon a centipede and asked him how he walked:
Left feet, then right feet? Odd feet, even feet? Front feet, back feet?
The centipede thought. And thought. . . .And never walked again.
That pretty well explains it. We academic lawyers are harmless
enough as long as we do law. However, when we start thinking about
what we are doing, we are likely to get into trouble. And we have
somehow come to question what we do. We search for purposes in
law. We plunge into other mysteries that we know naught of. "In-
stead of confining citation to books whose cards in the library catalog
include the word Law in the title, there has been a recent movement
into psychology, pomology, embryology, theology, ethics, home eco-
nomics, economics, politics, the sticks, the realisticks, and symbolic
logic."' The result is, if I may quote slightly out of context, that
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many of the niceties of property law are disappearing, not through
the deliberate choice of anyone, but rather through the lack of time
to master them in the face of demands made by what may be
conceded to be more significant matters.'
Those words were spoken fifteen years ago. By now we have lost, I
fear, more than mere niceties.
That the loss is significant I would not argue. Our common
corpus juris was not, after all, the deliberate choice of anyone, and if
we let it fall into decay after some seven centuries or so, it may be
that little will be lost. If the law of property has become irrelevant
and inexplicable, then I can-and do-teach environmental law.
But what is environmental law? I can only give examples. I
suppose that the Second Law of Thermodynamics is as good as any.
And what can I tell my cynical innocents about that? That they have
the professional responsibility to obey it? That it should be repealed
though we bring the whole structure of Time down about out heads?
Fiat justitia, ruat coelum? That the roof will fall in no matter how
dear old Justitia makes out?
Although most of my colleagues will protest that physical laws
are not what they have in mind, many of them will suggest that I
should teach economics in both Property and Environmental Law
courses. Perhaps I should, but it smacks of hubris and futility. I
rather suspect that, no matter how carefully we adhere to the moral
dictates of economics, the roof will fall in. And there is a more serious
problem: the new arcana of the Economic Analysis of Law presup-
poses a certain understanding, not only of economics, but of the goals
and mind of man. The trouble is that the Devil himself knoweth not
the mind of man, and I doubt that economists are in much better
shape.
Still, at the minimum (and who in troubled times can ask for
more than that?), it all seems harmless enough. We play with our
toys, talking learnedly of demand curves and social welfare functions.
What harm is there in making fools of ourselves? Until recently I
thought there was little enough. But Professor William Baxter has,
through his little pamphlet People or Penguins, frightened me. For
what if people take him seriously?
Ex nihilo nihilfit; nothing is made from nothing. I believe this
quite fervently.3 Nothing is the old enemy. And Professor Baxter,
C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSIO 17 (1961).
But then so did the poor old Cyclops before Nobody put his eye out.
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with his faint reek of brimstone (called "optimal pollution"), is one
of the new magi of Nothingness.
Professor Leff, another teacher of law, has isolated the problem.
We are, I think, beginning to see in the speedy spread of economic
analysis of law the development of a new basic academic theory of
law. Since its basic intellectual technique is the substitution of defi-
nitions for both normative and empirical propositions, I would call
it American Legal Nominalism.4
Of course, reasoning ex nihilo (or a priori, which is much the
same sort of thing) is not new to legal scholarship, but until now it
has been reserved for jurisprudence. Even so, jurisprudential theories
have a way of influencing even the most rigorously antiphilosophical
laborer in the fields of the law. Less than forty years ago, for exam-
ple, Dr. Teufelsdr6ckh, first postulated the pseudea;5 today I count
myself lucky if the mailman doesn't deliver a dozen before lunch.' Let
me refresh your recollection.
Observe: By introducing the principle of Multiguity of Terms,
pseudeas can be produced, and fast enough to meet the need, and
added to the theretofore available stuff and also held and owned in
the modern world, as perfect currency. A well engraved and hand-
some pseudea will buy as much as any idea-gold, and more than
some, just as a note may frequently be of more value than a bar of
yellow metal.7
You will recall that Teufelsdr6ckh also hypothesized the Principle of
Partiality (to say nothing of the Principle of the Hole).- The Principle
of Partiality, says Teufelsdrdckh,
Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism. 60 U. VA. L. Rtiv.
451, 459 (1974).
JURISPRUDENCE 173.
a Recently, for example, he brought me B. ACKERMAN, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF
PROPERTY LAW (1975).
JURISPRUDENCE 173.
The Principle rests simply in the addition of a W. Where there is in nature a
Hole, we put a Whole, and then stake out our claim as to where the Whole resides,
or what its Nature is. The finest instance is Sovereignty, but lovely things have been
done with the Validity of Norms, the Authority of Law, Absolute Justice, the Sum-
mum Bonum, the States of Legal History, the School of Realists. The resultant
issues can be sliced any way at all, with no fear of vulgar minds stumbling upon
embarrasing Inquiry:-there being nothing but a Hole to inquire into, let them
inquire, if they will!
Id. at 175.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 965 (1976)
is best brought out by the behavior (not the theory) of those blind
men who first gathered round the Elephant of Law to determine the
nature of his Elephantitude. . . .One, you will recall, announced
that the Elephant of Law was "mighty like a tree," one that he was
"mighty like a rope," one that he was "mighty like a wall." Though
good, this lacked perfection: the Principle of Absolutized Partiality
comes in then to do for Jurisprudence what Newton did for Coper-
nicus, Einstein for Newton. The elephant is a tree, or is a rope, or
is a wall, and nothing else or more: this gives something to go on.
Above all, it invites pseu-dispute and pseu-disproof of Elephanti-
tudes, not further inquiry into actual Elephants.'
The world has progressed considerably since 1938. Today mere
law professors use the pseudea as blithely as did the jurisprudes of
forty years ago. Of course, the subject matter has changed, as was
only to be expected once the mighty flight of Teufelsdr5ckh's theory
was brought to earth by more pedestrian hands. No longer is the talk
of Elephants; we are reduced to examining Penguins.
This brings me back to the pernicious little tract by Professor
Baxter, in which he discovers the pseu-dichotomy between People and
Penguins. Were I Teufelsdr5ckh, I would say that Baxter writes
about Penguinities. Were I Baxter, I would say that Baxter writes
about economics. For myself, I am reduced to silence.
Let Baxter speak for himself.
My criteria are oriented to people, not penguins. Damage to
penguins, or sugar pines, or geological marvels is, without more,
simply irrelevant. One must go further, by my criteria, and say:
Penguins are important because people enjoy seeing them walk
about rocks; and furthermore, the well-being of people would be less
impaired by halting use of DDT than by giving up penguins. In
short, my observations about environmental problems will be
people-oriented, as are my criteria. I have no interest in preserving
penguins for their own sake.1"
I have never seen Professor Baxter. I am not even sure that I
have ever seen a penguin. I am selfish enough not to lament greatly
the loss of one or the other, although I have not risen to that pure
state of alienation from the world which Professor Baxter asserts is
necessary for my salvation. Even so, if scientists inform me "that use
Id. at 174-75.
" W. BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS, THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 5 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as PENGUINS].
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of DDT in food producton is causing damage to the penguin popula-
tion"" or, for that matter, to Professor Baxter, then I am going to
worry. For what do these omens augur for those whom I love or,
more selfishly, for me? If penguins are poisoned in distant Antarctica
by DDT applied in North America, then what is the fate of my liver?
When the letters form upon the wall: MENE, MENE, TEKEL,
UPHARSIN, then the Baxters of the world proclaim: "Look, Jack,
you got a choice: People or Walls."
Let us see how Professor Baxter constructs his argument.
It may be said by way of objection to this position, that it is
very selfish of people to act as if each person represented one unit
of importance. . . . It is undeniably selfish. Nevertheless, I think
it is the only tenable starting place for analysis for several reasons.
First, no other position corresponds to the way most people really
think and act-i.e., corresponds to reality."
A bit anticlimactic perhaps, but there it is. Baxter is right, if selfish,
because Baxter corresponds to reality. This is not argumentation. It
is solipsism.
But I fear that it may persuade. In the first place, Baxter is an
Authority, and in the second, the proposition just quoted might ap-
pear to have an empirical basis. If we look into our souls, we find
that we are selfish. But only a blind man describing penguinities could
assert that man is selfish, and nothing else or more. There is some
reason to believe that we are also capable of altruism.' 3 Be that as
it may, let us assume that Professor Baxter has concluded, on the
basis of extensive and well-constructed empirical research, that all
men are selfish. So what? It still does not follow, cannot follow, that
"each person represents one unit of importance," for that last state-
ment is not and cannot be an empirical proposition. It is a definition
and nothing more. It is, however, on this proposition ex nihilo that
Baxter constructs his ingenious argument against penguins and in
favor of an effluent tax.
I am not sure that everyone will take my word that Baxter bases
his whole construct on that single ipse dixit, and I must admit that
he has given more justifications for his position. The first two of
those, however, are mere apologies; they represent no more than the
I Id. at 4.
2 Id. at 5.
' See. e.g., T. NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM (1970). Cf. E. WulsoN,
SOClOBIOLOGY 106-29, 551-54 (1975).
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unsupported claim that his argument is not that destructive to the
world.
Second, this attitude does not portend any massive destruction
of nonhuman flora and fauna, for people depend upon them in many
obvious ways, and they will be preserved because and to the degree
that humans do depend on them.
Third, what is good for humans is, in many respects good for
penguins and pine trees-clean air, for example. So that humans
are, in these respects, surrogates for plant and animal life. 4
Consider these statements for a moment. What assurance do we
have, other than Baxter's words drifting across the void, that these
claims are true? What about the nonobvious ways in which we depend
on the flora and fauna? What role do penguins play in that great
chain of being on which our lives depend? I do not know, nor does
Professor Baxter. Yet it is clear that Baxter's scheme cannot compre-
hend more than Baxter can imagine, and Baxter's imagination is so
limited that he can see no value in penguins other than the enjoyment
people obtain from watching them walk about rocks.
Let us examine the last sentence quoted. If we adopt Baxter's
attitude of selfishness, it is inconceivable that we should care (except
to feel insulted) that we are surrogates for plant and animal life. I
cannot believe that Professor Baxter considers it important that he
is a surrogate for a penguin. Or did he mean to say that the penguin
is a surrogate for Professor Baxter? But surely then he would have
sensed the poisons coursing in his veins.
In his next two arguments, Baxter gives the game away. How
does one justify using an argument ex nihilo? By admitting that one
cannot think of anything else.
Fourth, I do not know how we could administer any other
system . . . .
Fifth, if polar bears or pine trees or penguins, like men, are to
be regarded as ends rather than means, if they are to count in our
calculus of social organization, someone must tell me how much
each one counts, and someone must tell me how these life-forms are
to be permitted to express their preferences, for I do not know either
answer.
6
PENGUINS 5-6.
I d. at 6.
I d. at 7.
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I share Professor Baxter's ignorance of these matters. But I can
argue just as he does. I do not see how we can administer Professor
Baxter's system. If men are to be regarded as ends rather than means,
if they are to count in our calculus of social organization, someone
must tell me how much each one counts, and someone must tell me
how these life-forms are to be permitted to express their preferences,
for I do not know either answer. And neither does Professor Baxter,
although he supplies several that contradict themselves.
Let me now outline Professor Baxter's "system." One of his
axioms is that "every person should be free to do whatever he wishes
in contexts where his actions do not interfere with the interests of
other human beings." 7 His reasoning is nihilistic in that he supports
this claim only with the contention that no one will question it. And
indeed, why should one bother? None of the questions which Baxter
would answer can be exorcised by this criterion, for so long as one
person is concerned with the accumulation of DDT in the fatty tissues
of penguins, of Baxter, or of me, then no one else can invoke this
axiom as a justification for the use of DDT.
Professor Baxter also asserts that "[w]aste is a bad thing ....
Hence,. . . [no] resources, or labors, or skill, should be wasted-that
is, employed so as to yield less than they might yield in human
satisfactions.""8 At first glance this appears to be an argument of
some substance, but at base it is simply another argument by defini-
tion, for Professor Baxter does not tell us how to measure human
satisfactions and weigh them one against the other. To say that one
should not include the satisfactions of penguins in the felicific calcu-
lus does not go very far toward developing such a calculus.
Baxter, however, recognizes this problem and brings a novel
form of argumentation to bear on it. He admits that his sytem "as-
sumes we can measure in some way the incremental units of human
'I Id. at 2. Baxter's justification for this assumption is that "it is so basic a tenet of our
civilization-it reflects a cultural value so broadly shaped, at least in the abstract-that the
question 'why' is seen as impertinent or imponderable or both." Id. This is, of course, a
proposition that is empirically verifiable. Unfortunately Professor Baxter does not cite any
anthropological data for his contention. As an alternative hypothesis one might consider the
proposition that "every person should do what he considers to be morally correct." I suspect
that, "in the abstract," the latter proposition is more widely held its our culture than is Baxter's
sophomoric hedonism.
It may be that the law should leave each person free to do what he wishes-or what he
believes to be required by the dictates of morality. That is, however, not Professor Baxter's
contention. For Baxter is not speaking of the law; he is discussing the "normative question:
what ought we to do." Id. at 7.
11 Id. at 3-4.
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satisfaction yielded by very different types of goods. The proposition
must remain a pious abstraction until I can explain how this measure-
ment process can occur."19
That promised explanation has a breath-taking simplicity. Bax-
ter never again mentions the measurement of human satisfactions."0
This is not to say that Professor Baxter never again mentions "human
satisfactions," for he does. Most of his book is devoted to his theories
of the "most effective use of our resources," and he "insists" on
defining "resources" as including "all of [the] infinite variety of
sources of human satisfactions."'" This suggests that Professor Bax-
ter has confused "sources of human satisfaction" with the satisfac-
tions themselves. Whether the confusion is deliberate I cannot say.
The fact remains, however, that satisfactions and their sources
are different things. Let me give you an example. Assume that I have
a basket of sources of human satisfactions, viz., strawberries, and
that Baxter has a bowl of sources of human satisfactions, viz., cher-
ries, and I don't like strawberries and Baxter doesn't like cherries.
According to Baxter's system (copyright 1776 by Adam Smith) we
should trade, so let's assume that we do. And now (this is my hypo-
thetical and I will run it the way I want) I have a bellyache and Baxter
has hives and we are both mightily dissatisfied. It becomes clear that
the correspondence between the efficient use of our resources on the
one hand and our satisfaction on the other can be negative.
I admit that I am not playing Professor Baxter's game as defined
by Professor Baxter. For his system cannot work if you or I can make
a mistake, any more than it can deal with all those matters, like being
killed by insecticides, that Baxter refuses to imagine. I had better
mention at this point another of Baxter's axioms: "[Elvery adult,
unless he has been found mentally incompetent, should be permitted
to make his own judgment about what will advance his own well-
being."22 Why, Professor Baxter does not say. Unless you have never
made a mistake, I think you will agree that this is not necessarily a
formula for increasing human satisfactions.
Assume, for example, that there is a manufacturer of DDT
whose products are poisoning me. The manufacturer gets the satisfac-
tion of his profit, and I get the dissatisfactions associated with ill
11 Id. at 12.
2 Professor Baxter has thus created the ultimate argument ex nihilo: the argument itself
vanishes into nothingness.
21 PENGUINS 16.
2 Id. at 19.
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health. Would it increase human satisfaction if the manufacturer
were ordered to cease and desist? Baxter cannot rule this question
out, because it is one that he discusses throughout his book. The
answer obviously depends on whether the manufacturer gets more
satisfaction from his profits than I get dissatisfactions from my ill-
ness, and there is no obvious way of determining that. My exquisite
agonies may be trivial in comparison with the manufacturer's glee in
his ill-gotten gains. Or they may not. The only parties who could
testify are disqualified by bias, and neither can feel the other's pain
or joy.
The question of how one can compare the differing satisfactions
of differing men is meaningless, but Baxter answers it by simply
invoking his rule, already noted, that we should each count as one.
This, together with his rule that none of us can make mistakes,
permits him to conclude that both the manufacturer and I have one
vote: that my dissatisfactions are equal to the manufacturer's satis-
factions. That, of course, results in a stand-off, and the question
whether my hypothetical manufacturer should be allowed to continue
producing DDT remains unanswered.
Baxter, however, resolves this impasse by postulating that we
should not each count as one.
Both the incentive and the opportunity to improve his share of
satisfactions should be preserved to every individual. Preservation
of incentive is dictated by the "no-waste" criterion and enjoins
against the continuous, totally egalitarian redistribution of satisfac-
tions, or wealth; but subject to that constraint, everyone should
receive, by continuous redistribution if necessary, some minimal
share of aggregate wealth so as to avoid a level of privation from
which the opportunity to improve his situation becomes illusory.2
Some now count only a minimal amount. When this uneven
distribution of the sources of human satisfaction is plugged into Bax-
ter's system, we will find that if I am wealthy, I can bribe the manu-
facturer to stop, and if I am poor, I cannot. This means that if I am
wealthy it is wasteful to produce DDT and if I am poor it is wasteful
not to produce DDT. Further, I am allowed to be poor by Professor
Baxter's criteria because it would be wasteful not to give the manu-
facturer an incentive to produce DDT. Measuring human satisfac-
tions thus becomes a matter of measuring buying power, and buying
= Id. at 4.
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power is to be allocated so that the penguins-and you and I-lose.
Baxter is, of course, aware that some things are not traded in
the market and that buying power will not prevail in such cases. Most
of his pamphlet is devoted to what he chooses to call, after Garrett
Hardin, 24 the "problem of the commons," a phrase which Baxter
seems to believe means the same thing as "externality. ' 25 Baxter's
problem of the commons arises whenever "ownership rights are im-
precisely defined, ' 26 i.e., when there is a source of human satisfac-
tions like clean air, or peace and quiet, that cannot be marketed.
Baxter's solution to the problem is to tax polluters, or noise makers,
in the amount that they would have had to pay if there were precisely
defined ownership rights in such things. However, Baxter never does,
nor can, explain how to determine the market value, i.e., the market
price, of a source of human satisfactions that is unmarketable.
To return to my version of Baxter's argument, I do not know
how to administer Baxter's system because I do not know-and Bax-
ter cannot tell me-how to price unmarketable resources. If men are
to count in our calculus of social organization, I cannot tell how much
they should count because they are to be counted in accordance with
their wealth, which, in turn, is to be determined in accordance with
the demands of efficiency, which in turn is determined by the distribu-
tion of wealth. Nor can I tell how these life forms are to express their
preferences in the cases that concern Professor Baxter, because his
system is a market system and does not apply to the unmarketable.
Nor will it do to ask them what their preferences are, because in the
case of public goods, a concept which Baxter subsumes under his
label of the "commons," it is the accepted opinion of the school of
economists with which Baxter swims that the life-forms in question
will not tell the truth.17 Thus Baxter's argument dissolves into the
nothingness that gave it birth.
There is one further difficulty with Baxter's system that should
be mentioned. Do his human beings, each counting for one but some
more equal than others, include future generations? If so, how are we
24 Hardin, The Tradegy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (December 13, 1968).
2 PENGUINS 31.
28 Id. at 34.
21 See, e.g., Russell, Effluent Charges, in ECONOMICS OF AIR AND WATER POLLUTION 37
(W. Walker ed. 1969): "Because of the peculiar nature of public goods [i.e., goods not subject
to private ownership and thus goods included under Baxter's rubric of "the commons"], it is
in each citizen's interest to conceal his true preferences concerning the amount to be provided
if there is a chance that he will be charged according to his desire for the good."
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to know their preferences? If not, will our successors be any better
off than penguins in Baxter's brave new penguinless world? Since
Professor Baxter is not willing to confront this problem, I will quote
from an economist who did: "[Sluppose that, as a result of using up
all the world's resources, human life did come to an end. So what?""8
I am not saying that Baxter has the courage to carry his logic to this
final solution. But others may; that is why Baxter frightens me.
I suppose that I sound as if I am moralizing. I admit that I am.
But I still owe you Professor Baxter's final justification for his selfish-
ness.
Sixth, and by way of summary of all the foregoing, let me point
out that the set of environmental issues under discussion-although
they raise very complex technical questions of how to achieve any
objective-ultimately raise a normative question: what ought we to
do. Questions of ought are unique to the human mind and
world-they are meaningless as applied to a nonhuman situation.
I reject the idea that there is a "right" or "morally correct"
state of nature to which we should return. The word "nature" has
no normative connotation."
Professor Baxter, you see, is moralizing too. More correctly, Profes-
sor Baxter pretends that he is moralizing. It is true that his conclu-
sions are moral propositions, but his premises cannot lead him to
those conclusions. Worse, his final premise is blatantly untrue. The
assertion that the word "nature" lacks any moral connotation is a
monument to Baxter's self-imposed blindness. Once again he is play-
ing with definitions, but this time at the peril of our souls. For one
last time, let me demonstrate how Baxter works his system:
1. "God" denotes the unmoved mover (by definition, my
definition).
2. Words mean what I mean them to mean and nothing else
or more (by the Principle of Absolutized Partiality).0
3. Therefore, "God" lacks a normative connotation.
By appropriate use of the Principle of Absolutized Partiality one
can prove that there can be no normative connotations and, indeed,
no connotations whatsoever. I am not merely saying that Professor
Baxter should get him to a dictionary. What I am claiming is that
2 Beckerman, The Myth of "Finite" Resources, 12 BUSINESS & Soc. REV. 21, 22 (1974).
2' PENGUINS 7.
11 See text at note 9 supra.
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Professor Baxter's thought depends not only upon a rejection of the
entire empirical world (including penguins), but also upon a rejec-
tion of all moral, i.e. normative, questions. This is dangerous, if taken
seriously, both to the world and to morality. It is dangerous not only
because Baxter's system would allow one to justify liquidating Baxter
by defining him as a penguin (don't laugh unless you think that
Dachau is funny), but also because it represents an attack upon all
moral values.
What Baxter cannot grasp is that, if there is such a thing as
morality, it may lie in our relation to God, or to man, or to men, or
to society, or to future generations, or to nature, or to some free-
floating moral imperative, or to ourselves, or to a penguin, or to all
of the above. If we have a moral duty, if we "ought" to do something,
that does not mean that our obligation runs only to other human
beings. Baxter argues that only human beings have value, because
only human beings make evaluations, and only human beings have
standing to initiate law suits. Whether his premises are true or not,
the conclusion cannot follow. And if we accept his conclusion, we
must believe that only selfish acts are moral. That is a possible moral
position, but not one that many people would willingly accept. Bax-
ter considers any act that we do, no matter how altruistic in appear-
ance, a selfish act. Therefore all acts are to Baxter moral, and any-
thing good. Ex nihilo, ad nihilo.
I have some sympathy for Professor Baxter's predicament,
though none for his conclusions. All law professors are in the same
sinking ship these days. We are told repeatedly, and some of us
believe, that law should be an important means to accomplish the
ends of society. We are exhorted to teach not only what the law is
today and may be tomorrow, but what it ought to be. We are told to
teach not only the craft of lawyering, but also the social purposes that
should inform that craft. This suggests that we have to know what
the law ought to be and what social purposes should be sought
through the practice of our sullen art.
But we cannot know such matters with certainty, if only because
we, unlike the inhabitants of Professor Baxter's infertile imagination,
live in a world in which there are risks, known and unknown, and in
which we make mistakes. Most of us are content with raising the
questions and admitting that we have no answers. But some of us
seem to take our duties too seriously. We feel that we must supply
answers. And this in turn compels the Baxters among us to invent
hypothetical questions that we believe we can answer.
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In the larger scheme of things, I am sure, penguins are of more
importance than law teachers. But I am a law teacher, and I want,
selfishly, to plead the case against the gratuitous destruction of my
species-even at the hands of suicidal colleagues. To be a law profes-
sor, it seems to me, one has to deal with the law. But the lust for
answerable questions has led many of my colleagues-for Baxter is
only an exceptionally terrible example of a current fad-to reject in
toto the corpus of the law. Once we reject the law in all of its infinite
complexities, we law teachers have nothing to offer.
There are, fortunately, antidotes to this academic nihilism. The
best I have found is a casebook on environmental law compiled with
taste and intelligence by Hanks, Tarlock, and Hanks." This is not
to say, however, that Environmental Law is a paean to penguins.
Quite the contrary. Its authors are as concerned as Professor Baxter
with the costs of environmental protection and are as sensitive to
economic considerations, as indicated in their preface:
[Elvents like the "Energy Crisis" have made clear that Earth Day
speeches must give way to rigorous analysis and hard decisions: a
clean and attractive environment has its costs.
It is with this in mind that we offer these materials. We have
attempted to integrate the study of environmental law with the
study of concepts from other disciplines necessary to an assessment
of that law, primarily economics."
They have succeeded in their attempt, because they have not
thrown out the stuff of law for some "pop" economics, but have,
rather, integrated materials from other disciplines into a study of the
law itself. This does not mean that the economics in Environmental
Law is oversimplified, however. The student is confronted with
knotty little problems that Professor Baxter avoided in his pamphlet.
Included, for example, is Judge Bue's magnificent opinion in Sierra
Club v. Froehlke,3 with its careful consideration of such matters
as quantifying the environmental costs of governmental activities and
determining the present value of asserted future benefits from those
activities. Boxes within boxes, economics inside the law inside the
1' E. HANKS, A. TARLOCK, & J. HANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY (1974) [hereinafter cited as ENVIRONMENTAL LAW.]
2 Id. at xi.
" 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 335. The
benefit-cost analysis within the opinion is found at 359 F. Supp. 1362, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
374.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 965 (1976)
world in all its diversity. No one can read Froehlke and believe that
environmental problems are simple or that human answers can be
more than tentative, even when illuminated by economic insights.
Further, no one can read Froehlke and believe that the problem that
confronted Judge Bue, whether the corps of engineers had complied
with the mandate of the National Environmental Policy Act, could
be resolved by defining it out of existence.
Since the mills of the law, however slowly they turn, grind up
practically everything in the world, or at least in the United States,
one finds that far more than economics is integrated into legal mate-
rials. There is in Environmental Law, for instance, a passage from
the second opinion of the Federal Power Commission in the seminal
Storm King Mountain case,34 in which the testimony of art experts
about the mountain's aesthetic importance is considered:
The words of such eloquent witnesses, of course, quite oversha-
dow the pedestrian prose of examiners and commissioners. Still, as
counsel for the Sierra Club in brief succinctly stated the matter,
"[t]heir point was not an occult one. Their expertise lay in express-
ing it, not in feeling it." . . We therefore are impelled to say that
our conclusion that the license must issue does not rest upon any
discounting of the case made by the intervenors relating to the
natural beauty, historical significance, and spiritual qualities of
Storm King Mountain in its setting.
Just as the mountain has swallowed the scar of the highway,
the intrusive railroad structure and fills, and tolerates both the
barges and scows which pass by it and the thoughtless humans who
visit it without seeing it, so it will swallow the structures which serve
the needs of people for electric power.-"
This passage raises questions, and questions more significant
than the influence of Longfellow upon the prose style of the FPC. "I
reject," says Baxter, Professor of Law; but the law will not allow the
FPC the luxury of such nihilism. It may be that it is impossible to
strike a proper balance between the need for beauty and the need for
electricity. Yet a balance must be struck-doing the impossible is
always interesting-and the balancing process turns out to be part of
34 Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 44 F.P.C. 350 (1970), aff'd sub norm. Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conf. v. F.P.C., 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926
(1972). The opinion in Consolidated Edison is excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 254. See also
Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. F.P.C., 498 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1974); Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conf. v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
31 44 F.P.C. at 384, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 255.
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the legal process.
There is more to the world than Professor Baxter-or I-can
imagine, and more to the law too. One can even learn, reading foot-
notes, that the basis of morality is not in our selfishness but in our
mutual dependence: even the Devotions of John Donne are part of
the body of environmental law. 6 Environmental Law includes all
this and more. Yet it is no commonplace book, nor is it merely a
collection of cases from which an instructor can extract such lessons
as he likes. It is a compilation informed by intelligence. 7
At times I have feared that environmental law is incomprehen-
sible. One seems either to be confronted with a chaotic jumble of
cases, statutes, and environmental insults or with pure order, a la
Baxter, imposed on nothingness. But Environmental Law has shown
that this need not be so. Admittedly, its order is not inherent in the
world itself; it is a construct of the authors' intelligence, quite as
much as Baxter's is of his. But Environmental Law does not reject
both world and law; it makes their relation comprehensible. And if
the order is ultimately only of heuristic value, what other value in-
forn~s either teaching or the law?
The authors begin with a chapter called "Perspectives," one of
the best compilations of environmental writings I have seen. The
assumption clearly is that law students are "reasonably educated
person[s]"35 who have some competency in each of Lord Snow's
pseudichotomous Two Cultures. In the first chapter, the reader is
introduced to Garrett Hardin invoking the ghost of Hegel to goose-
step across the commons, 3' Lynn White worshipping at the shrine
of Francis of Assisi,"0 and Kenneth Boulding exploring the economics
of the Coming Spaceship Earth," each in his own fashion refuting the
" No man is an Band, intire of itselfe; every man is a peece of the Continent,
a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as
well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends or of thine owne
were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; And
therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.
J. DONNE, DEVOTIONS XVII, quoted in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 760 n.2 (1972)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 213.
n To me that is perhaps a special delight, since I once reviewed a similar casebook and
criticized it for its failure to impose order on chaos. Junger, Book Review, 22 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 598 (1971).
3' ENVIRONMENTAL LAW Xi.
3' Hardin, supra note 24, at 1243-48, excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 75.
1' White, The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis, 155 SCIENCE 1203 (March 10,
1967), excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 82.
" Boulding, The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
IN A GROWING ECONOMY 3 (H. Jarrett ed. 1966), excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1.
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impious simplicity of brother Baxter. There are also methodological
critiques: Kaysen criticizing the Club of Rome,42 Heller struggling to
reconcile the insights of economics with those of ecology, 3 Ehrlich
and Holdren criticizing Commoner," and Commoner criticizing Ehr-
lich and Holdren's criticism of Commoner.45 And we have the au-
thors' notes to all of this, hinting, guiding, explaining, supplying a
reading list that. could be a summer's delight. "Perspectives" ends
with the first appearance of purely legal materials: the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Sierra Club v. Morton," invoking
the day when, in effect, the voice of the penguin shall be heard
throughout the land.47 There are no easy answers here, but rather
decent thought by decent men, giving not only perspectives but also
some sense of the underlying complexities both of the world and of
human thought and values.
The authors turn to "Population" for their second chapter, start-
ing with the question: "What is a Population Problem?"46 They pro-
vide a frightening dose of statistics and demographic theory, com-
plete with population profiles. Then suddenly we are confronted with
the law: that remarkable riddle within an enigma, Roe v. Wade.4" The
authors continue through the progeny of enigma, Roe and Doe,0
cases, statutes, and articles, to a final section on population entitled
"Beyond 'Free Choice,'" which raises, gently and obliquely, certain
questions of justice hidden in economic studies, including Boulding's
proposal for "a system of marketable licenses to have children." 51
42 Kaysen, The Computer That Printed Out W*O*L*F*, 50 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 660 (1972),
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 18.
3 Heller, Coming to Terms with Growth and the Environment, in ENERGY, ECONOMIC
GROWTH, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 3 (S. Schurr ed. 1972), excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
25.
4 Ehrlich & Holdren, Review: The Closing Circle, 14 ENVIRONMENT 24 (1972), excerpted
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 43.
' Commoner, Review: The Closing Circle, 14 ENVIRONMENT 25 (1972). excerpted in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 59.
46 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972), excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 88.
' [Tihese environmental issues should be tendered by the inanimate object
itself. Then there will be assurances that all of the forms of life which it represents
will stand before the court-the pileated woodpecker as well as the coyote and bear,
the lemmings as well as the trout in the streams.
405 U.S. at 752, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 92.
" ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 93.
410 U.S. 113 (1973), excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 125.
'o Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 132.
SI K. BOULDING, THE MEANING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 135-36 (1974), excerpted
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 170.
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Once again the authors are able to illustrate the collision between
conflicting values by turning to legal sources, in this case, Dandridge
v. Williams.5 2 Dandridge is as good a lesson as a law student is likely
to find in that basic point of legal studies: the choice of the question
asked tends to determine the answer given.5
Then comes one of the key chapters in the book: "Judicial Re-
view of Complex Decision Making," which considers "the basic ques-
tion . . . whether the protection of environmental values requires the
introduction of new legal constraints on administrative and (to a
lesser extent) legislative decisionmaking."54 It gives, within a surpris-
ingly small compass, an excellent introduction to the legal problems
associated with sovereign immunity, standing, freedom of informa-
tion, and what the authors denominate the "common law" of judicial
review (meaning the law of judicial review of administrative agencies
without regard to the National Environmental Policy Act). I do not
know where one could find a better introduction to the law of federal
jurisdiction as it affects environmental problems.
The key section of this third chapter is devoted to the National
Envi'onmental Policy Act. It is here that the student is exposed not
only to the complexities of the law, but also to the infinitely more
variegated complexities of the world itself. The chapter also includes
an introduction to some of the major issues of public utility regula-
tion, including not only problems of the siting of plants and transmis-
sion lines, but also problems of pricing.
The next chapter deals with "Land and Resources Management
and Control." Once again the authors start with selected introductory
passages: a section from the report of the Public Land Law Review
52 397 U.S. 471 (1970), ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 173.
3 In Dandridge, the Court (per Stewart, J.), keeping its eye firmly upon the interests of
hard-pressed agents of the state, proclaimed:
Conflicting claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and
proponents of almost every measure.. . . But the intractable economic, social, and
even philosophical problems presented by public welfare are not the business of this
Court.
397 U.S. at 487, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 175. The dissenters, on the other hand, kept their eyes
just as firmly fixed on the unequal treatment accorded to particular children who happen willy-
nilly to be born into large families:
[Gjovernmental discrimination between children on the basis of a factor over which
they have no control-the number of their brothers and sisters-bears some resembl-
ance to the classification between legitimate and illegitimate children which we con-
demned as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause in Levy v. Louisiana ....
397 U.S. at 523, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 177.
m ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 186.
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Commission;" a selection from Demsetz's oft-quoted article, "To-
ward a Theory of Property Rights,""6 representing a position that
Professor Baxter would find congenial (if perhaps a bit rigorous); a
countervailing and still more rigorous passage from Rawls' A Theory
of Justice;7 and finally, zeroing in on the specific problems of the
public domain, a selection from Hall's article, "Strategy and Organi-
zation in Public Land Policy."58 The authors then plunge into the
body of law, both decisional and statutory, that regulates the uses of
our public lands.
This chapter also includes a timely collection of cases on the
control of private land use. Once again the problems cannot be sub-
jected to simple-minded analysis on the basis of efficiency. The diffi-
culties lie in questions of fairness: of fairness in the distribution of
wealth and of fairness in causing individuals to make unequal contri-
butions to the public welfare. Should Ramapo-9 or Petaluma" be
allowed to control their growth and, in the process, deprive their
poorer neighbors of the hope of settling in such suburban Edens?
Should the owners of lands which happen to be wet be compelled to
dedicate them to "natural uses" while their drier neighbors get rich
performing unnatural acts?6" Those are real questions, legal ques-
tions which cannot be defined away.
The last chapter is a magnificent compilation of materials on
pollution control, a study of both private rights and remedies. As
always, there is introductory material from other disciplines, particu-
larly economics, but no simplistic exhortations against penguins.
These materials should compel even the most recalcitrant law student
to think, and they are meshed neatly into the legal problems. As a
teacher I have not seen a better presentation of statutory material
than appears in the section on Public Pollution Control, which even
includes some readings which deal with Baxter's panacea, the effluent
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND (1970),
excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 457.
5 57 Am. ECON. REV. 347 (1967), excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 461.
51 J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 266-74 (1971), excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
465-69.
" 7 NAT. RES. J. 162 (1967), excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 469.
" Golden v. Planning Board of the Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291,
334 N.Y.S. 2d 138 (1972), notedat 64 A.L.R.3d 1157, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972),
in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 671.
'o Construction Industry Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
rev'd, 522 F.2d 897 (1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976), in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 688.
41 See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), excerpted in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 690.
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tax.12 Here one can find, in form which should be comprehensible to
most law students, the reasons why many economists think that ef-
fluent taxes are desirable. One can also find a recognition of the
difficulties inherent in trying to adopt such a regime: the intractability
of problems involving joint costs and benefits (a problem which the
student will already have considered in the earlier section on utility
pricing), the problem that people will be tempted to lie about their
preferences, the question of the fairness of differing charges for old
polluters and new ones, the problem of the cost of information, and
the problem of political acceptability.
One of the charms of Environmental Law is the variety of prob-
lems which arise in each of its chapters. Another is that these prob-
lems are often dealt with, not by courts of last resort, but by legisla-
tures and by "inferior" courts which are nearer the cutting edge of
the law and are, therefore, less able than the olympians of the appel-
late level to resolve real world problems on the basis of abstract
doctrines (in a manner reminiscent of Baxterian nihilism). Whether
we should protect penguins is an interesting question beyond our
professional competency. Our questions are different: how does our
legal system respond to the phenomenon of poisoned penguins? How
can Baxter go about implementing his modest proposal? How can
others go about frustrating Baxter? How can we go about changing
our legal system to accomplish our chosen ends? And finally, ulti-
mately, how can we do all this within the structure of existing law?
There is plenty now for us lawyers to get our teeth into, whether
we believe in-or understand-arguments based on economic effi-
ciency. One of the pleasures of Environmental Law is that it exposes
such problems in the environment in which they arise. That environ-
ment is not, of course, a vacuum within a law professor's mind, nor
is it a self-sufficient system of legal dogmas adopted, ex cathedra and
five-to-four, by the Supreme Court. It is the entire hurly-burly of the
law, in which trial courts and state courts have, in the aggregate, far
more to say than nine overworked oracles in Washington, in which
the ultimate decision makers may not be courts or legislators at all,
but city councils and boards of zoning appeals. It is the environment
in which lawyers actually find themselves, the world into which we
send our students.
This is the very stuff of lawyering. At a minimum it is our duty
as law teachers to prepare our students to deal with purely legal
,1 E.g., Russell, supra note 27, at 37-55, excerpted in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 886.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 965 (1976)
problems. It might be nice, or even useful, if our students know some
economic theory. It is essential, however, that they be able to read a
statute creating legal rights and liabilities. It is essential that they
have some sense of tactics. It is essential that they grasp the fact that
the courts are, to use Professor Dworkin's terminology, 3 more likely
to be persuaded by arguments of principle than by arguments of
policy. An understanding, or misunderstanding, of economic policy
may have been responsible for the decision by Congress to pass the
Clean Air Act; but what a law student must grasp is that the courts,
whether or not they accept that policy, are bound by certain legal
principles, including the fundamental one that courts are not to sub-
stitute their policy judgments for those of the legislature.
This fundamental point is clearly illustrated by the cases in-
cluded in the last section of Environmental Law. I know of no better
way to teach a law student the mysteries of statutory interpretation
than to present him with a copy of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and then ask him, as do Hanks, Tarlock, and Hanks, a
few simple questions:
Suppose a farmer pumps ground water for irrigation or stores up-
stream water for the same purpose, in either case indirectly causing
salt water intrusion of a river. Has he violated § 301(a)? Is salt water
a "pollutant" as defined in § 502? Is it "pollution"? See §§ 502(6)
and 502(19). In reply to a question by Senator Bayh of whether it
is pollution, Senator Muskie replied: "I would state that it is the
intention of the conferees and of the bill that such salt water intru-
sion is pollution as defined in section 502 of the bill." . . . Quite
apart from whether salt water is a pollutant or pollution within the
meaning of the Act, would the farmer's actions constitute a "dis-
charge of any pollutant"? See §§ 502(12) and 502(6). Is the causing
of "pollution" a violation of§ 301(a)? Salt water intrusion is specifi-
cally mentioned in the Act in § 208(b)(2)(1). 6
Those are questions for a lawyer, hard questions which no one else
can answer, questions which will someday be asked in actual litiga-
tion. We lawyers, professors, students, have a job to do. If anything
can show us how to do that job, our job, it is Environmental Law.
This is high praise, but I think that Hanks, Tarlock, and Hanks
deserve it. That is not to say, however, that theirs is the perfect
casebook. For one thing, being about environmental law, it simply
'3 Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1076.
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cannot be completely up to date. There is an excellent supplement,
but the law changes too rapidly to ever be pinned down. Furthermore,
it contains at least one booby trap. The copy of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act contained in Environmental Law omits (with-
out any indication of an omission) § 501, which gives the Administra-
tor of the EPA the authority to adopt regulations.
All in all, though, it is a better job than I would have thought
possible. There are a few additional cases that I would have liked to
have seen included, but de gustibus. It is a large book already. It is
somewhat unfortunate that a book with as many excellent readings
as this one lacks a table of secondary authorities to match its compre-
hensive table of cases. I also wish that the distinction between the
readings, which focus for the most part on questions of economic
policy, and the cases, which focus on problems of fairness, had been
made more explicit. Still Hanks, Tarlock, and Hanks have given us
both the policy and the legal principles, and the meal they set before
us is delicious.
Yet something is still missing. Not something that we could
expept-or want-to find in a casebook, but something is still miss-
ing. If there is a flaw in Environmental Law, it is that it is permeated
with a touch of hubris, with the belief that we have some control over
the environment and ourselves, beyond being merely the passive
agents of destruction. Professor Baxter applies rational thought in a
vacuum; Hanks, Tarlock, and Hanks apply it to the law in all of its
variousness. The rationality of the latter authors is a virtue in our
trade-law is a very rational business. But the question remains
whether the world itself is so rational.

